Letters
to the editor in response to Ejaz Haider's opinion
piece: Insight:
Balochistan needs a rethink, DailyTimes.com.pk,
Jan 7, 2009 (Mr. Haider's full article below):
(Note from thebaluch
editors: We are told that
in the Mekran region, Panjgur district to be
precise, there has not been a Sardari system
for decades. The district does still not have
good hospitals, schools and basic amenities of
life.)
Jan 7, 2009
Dear Sir,
In his article "Balochistan
needs a rethink" (Daily Times, January 7, 2009)
Ejaz Haider states: Is it possible, before the
Baloch nationalists begin to talk about democracy
and rights and resource allocation, that they
could show themselves up to be "modern" rather
than celebrating one of the worst tribal structures
one can find anywhere?"
This is similar to what we
have been hearing from successive military rulers
of Pakistan about the country's politicians.
The army officers justify their coups by billing
the politicians as corrupt, incompetent and insincere.
Similarly, in Balochistan's context, the government
and scholars supporting the establishment keep
saying the same about the Baloch sardars that
they should "show themselves up to be "modern".
What is the modernity that Ejaz Haider expects
from the Baloch political leaders?
Let's not for God's sake confuse
the Baloch issue with its tribal set-up. The
current insurgency, just like the previous ones,
is not about the tribal system. It is about fair
treatment of a federating unit in a modern federation.
Every federation is expected to treat its federating
units with respect, not to look at them as colonies.
Balochistan, on the other hand, as been treated
by Islamabad merely as a colony.
The people of Balochistan did
not pick up guns five times in the last 60 years
during their existence with Pakistan not because
they were dissatisfied with their tribal chiefs.
Instead, they rose against Islamabad against
the injustices of the successive rulers based
in Islamabad. Furthermore, Mr. Haider must know
that Sanaullah Baloch is no Sardar. He is a middle
class educated Baloch leader. Similarly, the
whole leadership of the National Party (NP),
another leading nationalist outfit, does not
have a single Sardar in its ranks. The NP entirely
comprises of modern, educated, liberal and secular
leaders. It is bad regrtable if you offend them
by suggesting them to "show themselves up to
be "modern".
It is not the Baloch tribal
elders who killed a large number of Baloch population
in repeated military operations. But it was the
Pakistani military that killed hundreds of innocent
people, subjected thousands of them to enforced
disappearances. The Baloch nationalist leaders
of the National Awami Party (NAP) continued to
languish in the jails under Hyderabad Conspiracy
case for years in 1970s while rest of the so-called
modern, secular Pakistani leaders were engaged
in supporting the autocratic regime of Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto.
Mr Haider is affronting the Baloch sentiments
when he fails to give any solutions except holding
the Baloch nationalists responsible for the backwardness
of the province. The so-called tyrant sardars
of Balochistan have not been demanding powers
for themselves or legitimacy for their hold on
their respective tribes. They have been seeking
constitutional reforms. They have their political
parties, abided by the Constitution of Pakistan
and always respected the political process against
the popular insurgency. All they are asking for
is complete provincial autonomy, not only for
the Baloch sardars but for the Sindhis, Pashtoons
and the Punjabis living in the remaining three
provinces of Pakistan. How would one describe
them wrong when they are not talking about the
protection of their tribal system but for constitutional
reforms that ensures a just distribution of the
national resources in the National Finance Commission
Award?
Kanwal Gichki
Turbat, Balochistan
****************************
The letter in full:
Dear Sir,
I am not sure if Ejaz Haider
has any evidence when he says " The late Akbar
Khan Bugti not only ruled his area like a medieval
tyrant, Dera Bugti even today has the worst human
development indices in Pakistan." (Balochistan
needs a rethink, Daily Times, January 7, 2009).
This is simply putting the old wine in a new
bottle. Blaming the Baloch tribal elders as the
root cause of Balochistan's backwardness is an
old joke that no one agrees to buy anymore. Everyone
knows that there is something with Balochistan
and these excuses have not convinced any of us.
After all, Sardars, Chaudharies, feudal lords,
Zardaris and Sharifs continue to sit in all four
provincial assemblies and the Parliament. They
are everywhere. Their approach is the same everywhere.
Balochistan's issue is not
its Sardars but Islamabad's brazen refusal to
confess its exploitative designs.
If Nawab Bugti was truly in
control of everything in Dera Bugti then I wonder
how the government managed to establish a huge
gas plant in Sui as early as 1950s. The government
could easily establish a gas plant to exploit
the Baloch gas, recruit non- Baloch in these
gas companies, establish check posts of the Frontier
Corps and supply this gas to the whole country
on the cost of Baloch deprivation, except developing
the local infrastructure. The government did
everything to exploit the Baloch resources except
for establishing schools, colleges and hospitals
in the area. If Akbar Khan was a "medieval tyrant" then
how did he allow the government to pursue its
exploitative agenda?
I wonder if Mr. Ejaz Haider
knows how many people in Balochistan have access
to gas? Even the residents of Sui, as documentary
shown in People Power program indicated, are
still obliged to cut woods to make a fire? The
gas companies have made high standard schools
inside the colonies where the employees of the
gas companies live to educate their children
but the same facility is denied to Baloch kids.
If the government could successfully
pursue its exploitative agenda of usurping the
Baloch gas to fuel the industries of Punjab for
sixty years, how could it not undertake a development
program comprising of construction of schools,
colleges and hospitals? Secondly, I do not understand
what is the yardstick for measuring the democratic
credentials of a Baloch nationalist leader? Akbar
Khan Bugti could surely rule his area as a "medieval
tyrant" but despite this he still formed the
Jamori Watan Party (JWP), a purely democratic
party, which forced him to seek people's votes.
If he were a "medieval tyrant" then his son would
not get killed on broad day light by the supporters
of the Establishment.
I think as long as intellectuals
like Ejaz Haider even fall victim of false official
propaganda and avoid seeing things objectively,
Balochistan issue will further be complicated.
SIDRA BALOCH
Quetta
From DailyTimes.com.pk with
Ejaz Haider's answer (below): http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\01\08\story_8-1-2009_pg3_7
Rethinking Balochistan
Sir: With reference to Ejaz Haider's article “Balochistan needs a rethink” (Daily
Times, January 7), I am not sure if the writer has any evidence when he says: “The
late Akbar Khan Bugti not only ruled his area like a medieval tyrant, Dera Bugti
even today has the worst human development indices in Pakistan.”
Blaming the Baloch tribal elders for the province's backwardness is an excuse
that no one accepts anymore. After all, apart from the sardars, feudal lords
hold power in other provinces as well, and follow the same approach. Balochistan's
problem is not its sardars, but Islamabad's refusal to confess to its exploitative
designs. Consider that if Nawab Bugti was truly in total control of Dera Bugti,
how did the government manage to establish a huge gas infrastructure in Sui to
supply the rest of Pakistan while denying development to the Baloch? The government
used Baloch gas to fuel industries but did not undertake a development programme
in Balochistan. Also, Akbar Bugti formed the Jamhoori Watan Party, which was
a purely democratic party that forced him to seek the people's votes.
As long as intellectuals continue to fall victim to false official propaganda
and avoid objective analysis, the Balochistan issue will remain unresolved.
SIDRA BALOCH
Quetta
Ejaz Haider replies: The last comprehensive HDI data compilation
at district level is contained in the UNDP's National Human Development Report
2003 for Pakistan. Jhelum was the top district with an HDI of 0.703, while Dera
Bugti was the lowest with an HDI of 0.285. As for Ms Baloch's contention about
how the government could set up a huge infrastructure at Sui, the less said the
better about the quid pro quo involved and who benefited from it at the expense
of the people of Sui. Ms Baloch has also resorted, deliberately and arbitrarily,
to conflating feudal, tribal and other categories to fudge the issue. I think
she needs to re-read the article to see what I have written about Islamabad.
But, if as a woman she is satisfied with the Baloch social-tribal structure,
who am I to object?
****************************
INSIGHT:
Balochistan needs a rethink —Ejaz Haider
Negotiations are a function of a secular conception
of the state, not a theological one. The Baloch
nationalists may be involved in some excesses
but they can still be dealt with through a combination
of strategies. Not so the Islamists
The Balochistan National Party (BNP) Information
Secretary and former senator Mr Sanaullah Baloch
has told this newspaper of a presumed policy
by the federal government “to pit the religious
elements against the Baloch nationalists”.
Just in case anyone thought Mr Baloch was being
mealy-mouthed about the identity of the “religious
elements”, he referred to the “supporters” of
the Taliban who have allegedly “captured
land worth Rs2 billion in the eastern and western
parts of Quetta” to “undermine the
Baloch nationalist movement”.
Mr Baloch also “wondered why the state
had not carried out military operations against
these elements while it was still attacking Dera
Bugti and Sui areas”. He also referred
to the problem of the Afghan refugees and called
them “a burden on the economy of Balochistan
and the biggest cause of lawlessness and terrorism
in the country’s largest province”.
Since Balochistan is strategically immensely
important for Pakistan, Mr Baloch’s allegations
cannot be brushed aside lightly. Let’s
try and go step by step.
Mr Baloch has referred to “Baloch nationalists” and
the “supporters of the Taliban”.
His first categorisation means two things: one,
there is a presence of elements in Balochistan
who are not fully subsumed in the larger national
identity; two, these elements, traversing the
spectrum from the moderate to the hard-line,
are opposed to what can broadly be called the
status quo.
Since we have referred to the moderates at one
end and hard-liners at the other, it is safe
to assume that the tactics adopted to compel
the state to change the status quo would range
from negotiations to a resort to violence. Not
only that, we can also assume that changing the
status quo itself may vary in terms of expectations
and definition from the moderates (minimalist)
to the hard-liners (maximalist).
For instance, the moderates may, both in terms
of tactics as well as expectations, want greater
autonomy for the province and greater control
over its resources (changing the terms of the
National Finance Commission Award and the Council
of Common Interest, for instance). This would
mean reviewing the issue of provincial autonomy
in the 1973 Constitution, not just in relation
to Balochistan, but across the board, besides
revisiting the formulae for the allocation of
resources etc and adjudication for provincial
grievances.
Leaving aside the modalities, and there are
many, this would still boil down to the acceptance
of a federal arrangement, though with less centralised
powers for Islamabad. And, this is a negotiating
position, one in which staying within the system
and working it to one’s advantage would
be considered better than opting out and subverting
the system.
Rising higher on the conflict ladder, we reach
the demand for a confederal arrangement. Confederations
are usually created by treaty and adopt a common
constitution. The central government only deals
with such critical issues such as defence, foreign
affairs, a common currency etc while letting
the states be and providing equal support to
all member-states. Essentially, it is, according
to modern terminology, a permanent union of sovereign
states for common action in relation to other
states.
In theory, confederal arrangements allow smaller,
sovereign state-units, to enjoy their freedom
of action at one end and the binding support
of a central structure for joint defence at the
other.
This is generally unworkable. The confederation
of German States (1815-66) and North German States
(1866-71), as well as other such instances, show
the difficulty of such arrangements, both at
the conceptual and functional levels. Such arrangements
are always dogged by the problem of where sovereignty
rests and with whom, and from that flows functional
problems of effective control, support, allocation
of resources etc.
A demand by federal units for a confederal arrangement
is thus a covert euphemism for breaking away,
not exactly a negotiating position for reviewing
a federalist structure.
On the other hand, autonomous units that seek
to come together under such arrangement either
break up (several examples) and go back to exercising
state sovereignty or, as roughly may be the case
with the European Union, retain the core of sovereignty
while relinquishing some aspects of it on the
periphery.
The last rung on this ladder is of course secession — overt
breaking away. This is not a negotiating position
at all. It leads to conflict, usually armed.
The secession of East Pakistan is a case in point.
But precisely because of that experience, the
Centre of the Pakistani state is likely to come
down hard, and ruthlessly, on those elements
that might start with such a position — or
even arrive at it.
However, in the case of Balochistan, simmered
as it has for a long time, it would be safe to
argue that unless the situation is resolved,
we may see more movement from the moderate end
of the spectrum towards the hard-liners.
If Mr Baloch is right then it seems the state
has decided to neutralise the “secular” Baloch
nationalists with their parochial, ethnically-grounded
agenda through the use of “religious” elements
who may not be ethnically parochial but want
to sacralise the state and link it up with a
mythical pan-Islamism.
And pan-Islamism, while being expansive in terms
of rejecting parochial identitieswithin Islam
is nonetheless reductionist in terms of how it
views the out-groups and conceives its modes
of interaction with them.
Here we run into two problems then.
The first has to do with the Baloch nationalists.
If it is about peoples’ representation
then we have unfortunately not seen such movement
so far in that province. The province’s
leaders, for all the clamouring about rights
etcetera, have woefully fallen short of reforming
their social structures. The late Akbar Khan
Bugti not only ruled his area like a medieval
tyrant, Dera Bugti even today has the worst human
development indices in Pakistan.
The same is true of other sardars who claim
to speak on behalf of the people of Balochistan.
Is it possible, before the Baloch nationalists
begin to talk about democracy and rights and
resource allocation, that they could show themselves
up to be “modern” rather than celebrating
one of the worst tribal structures one can find
anywhere?
This, let it be said, is as important, if not
more, than the issue of devolving powers to the
provinces which must be done as per the original
spirit of the 1973 constitution. Even so, without
internal social reformation, no amount of provincial
autonomy will help the Baloch develop meaningfully
or join the development mainstream.
In fact, this is just the point which may help
clinch the argument in favour of allowing development
to go through, something the Baloch nationalists
have not allowed so far, opting instead to cut
their nose to spite their face. This social reformation
should be the agenda of the moderates who must
also negotiate with the Centre for greater rights.
On the part of the state, pitting Islamists
against a “threat” that can be dealt
with through negotiations is the worst possible
policy because it is likely to view tactical
victories as a strategic, long-term plus which
such victories, if there might such be, definitely
are not.
The state must remember that negotiations are
a function of a secular conception of the state,
not a theological one. The Baloch nationalists
may be involved in some excesses, but they can
still be dealt with through a combination of
strategies.
Not so the Islamists.
Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday
Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can
be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
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