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From
jamestown.org: |
Volume 6, Issue 1 (January
11, 2008) | Download
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Insurrection in Iranian Balochistan
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.html?articleid=2373892
By Chris
Zambelis
Issues of dissent and rebellion
amongst Iran's elaborate patchwork of ethnic and sectarian
minority communities are receiving increasing international
scrutiny. Many advocacy organizations representing Iranian
minorities accuse Tehran of operating a policy of cultural
subjugation aimed at erasing identities distinct from Iran's
dominant Persian culture and Shiite brand of Islam. In
some cases, these grievances have led to unrest and bloodshed.
The latest round of violence between ethnic Baloch nationalists
led by Jondallah (“Soldiers of God”) and Iranian security
forces in the province of Sistan-Balochistan is indicative
of this wider trend in Iranian society. The shadowy Jondallah
group emerged sometime in 2003 to advocate on behalf of
Baloch rights. It has been known to operate under other
monikers as well, including the People's Resistance Movement
of Iran (PMRI).
Tehran has implicated Jondallah in a series of high-profile
terrorist and guerrilla attacks against the security
forces and symbols of the regime in Iranian Balochistan.
Bold operations—such as the June
2005 abduction of Iranian military and intelligence personnel along
the Iranian-Pakistani border and the February 2007 car bomb attack
against a bus transporting members of the elite Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) just outside of the provincial capital of Zahedan
that left 11 dead and scores injured—have become a Jondallah signature
(see Terrorism Focus, February 27, 2007).
Iranian government sources reported a series of clashes
in recent weeks between Jondallah rebels and the IRGC
and provincial police forces in Iranian Balochistan.
On December 13, Iranian security units reported killing
12 men belonging to Jondallah and arresting others affiliated
with the group in the city of Iranshahr. Security officials
also reported the discovery of a weapons cache that included automatic
rifles, ammunition, detonators and explosives material, as well as
communications equipment and what were described as “important internal
documents.” They also claimed that the detainees confessed to being
part of a cell planning a series of bombings across the province
in an effort to foment ethnic and sectarian unrest (Islamic Republic
News Agency, December 13, 2007).
Subsequent reports alleged that Jondallah leaders and
four men directly implicated in previous terrorist attacks
were among those killed and detained by Iranian security
forces (Voice of the Islamic Republic TV, December 19,
2007). In a December 14 interview, Jondallah's young
leader Abdulmalak Rigi disputed the official casualty
count, and claimed that only one member of his group
was killed in the battle. Rigi, who is reported to be
in his mid-twenties, also claimed that Iranian forces
killed civilians during the skirmishes—including women
and children—and that his forces killed 26 IRGC officers. He vowed
to “take revenge for the women and children who were killed” (Voice
of the Islamic Republic TV, December 19, 2007).
In another sign of escalating tensions, Iran hanged two Baloch men
convicted of armed robbery and drug smuggling on December 31, in
a Zahedan prison and amputated the right hand and left foot of five
others convicted on armed robbery and kidnapping charges a few days
later (Iranian Students' News Agency, January 6; balochpeople.org,
January 7). Baloch activists accuse Tehran of systematically harassing
dissidents in the province by accusing them of false criminal charges
in an effort to intimidate opposition elements. In a January 3 incident,
Baloch sources reported that Iranian security forces opened fire
against a vehicle delivering drinking water to a wedding ceremony
on a busy street in Zahedan. Witnesses videotaped the alleged incident
and the ensuing chaos and posted it online [1].
Nationalism and Rebellion in West Balochistan
The Baloch national question has been a source of simmering tensions
for decades. Iran's approximately one to four million-strong Baloch
community inhabits the southeastern province of Sistan-Balochistan
[2]. This desolate and underdeveloped region is one of Iran's poorest
provinces. Unlike most Iranians, the Baloch
are predominantly Sunni Muslims. Violent crackdowns and repression
by security services in the economically backward province have engendered
deep-seated animosity toward the Shiite Islamist regime among the
fiercely independent and proud Baloch people.
Iranian Baloch identify with their kin in neighboring
Pakistan's southwestern province of Balochistan—home to the region's largest
Baloch population at approximately four to eight million—and the
smaller Baloch community in southern Afghanistan. The Pakistani Baloch
are engaged in their own long-running struggle for greater rights
and independence through a violent insurgency against Islamabad.
The sum of these circumstances imbues the Baloch national consciousness
with a sense of historic persecution at the hands of imperial powers
that left the Baloch nation divided and without a state of its own.
Baloch nationalists see the unification of their people in an independent “Greater
Balochistan” as a historical right. The plight of Iranian Balochistan,
referred to as “West Balochistan” by Baloch nationalists, is a pillar
of the wider Baloch nationalist cause [3].
Despite a lack of evidence, Tehran accuses Jondallah
of serving as an affiliate of both al-Qaeda and the Taliban,
claims the group emphatically denies (see Terrorism Monitor,
June 29, 2006). Jondallah does, however, rely on religious
discourse to highlight its grievances against the Shiite
Islamist regime. This most likely represents an effort
to highlight the Iranian Baloch position as an oppressed
ethnic and sectarian minority within the Shiite Islamist
clerical regime. Nevertheless, there are no indications
that the group has ties to radical Sunni Islamists. Iran
also links Jondallah to other Iranian opposition groups—including the radical People's Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI),
more commonly referred to as the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), and the
affiliated National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)—in an effort
to tarnish its reputation. Tehran also accuses Jondallah of harboring
secessionist aspirations. Abdulmalak Rigi has stated on numerous
occasions that his group's goal is not secession, but the achievement
of equal rights for his people in a reformed Iran. Essentially, Jondallah
frames its campaign as a war of self-defense. At the same time, Rigi
has gone so far as to declare himself an Iranian and Iran as his
motherland (roozonline.com, May 10, 2006). This is a position held
by other Iranian Baloch dissident groups advocating on behalf of
greater Baloch rights. Organizations such as the Balochistan United
Front and the Balochistan National Movement coordinate closely with
other ethnic and sectarian-minded opposition groups agitating for
greater rights and representation in Iran, including the Congress
of Nationalities for a Federal Iran [4].
Iranian authorities often describe the group as Pakistani-based
in an apparent effort to implicate outside forces in
the insurgency, especially the United States. Iran also
occasionally accuses Pakistan of turning a blind eye
to Jondallah activities, despite a strong record of Iranian
and Pakistani cooperation in suppressing Baloch nationalism
on both sides of the border. Iran also suggests Jondallah
is a creation of the CIA, an allegation strongly denied by Rigi himself.
Iran believes that the United States and other hostile forces are
providing moral, material and financial support to ethnic and sectarian-based
secessionist movements—including insurgent and terrorist organizations—to
undermine the Islamic Republic. Tehran is convinced that any potential
U.S. attack against Iran stemming from tensions over its nuclear
program or alleged support for insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan
will include a campaign to destabilize the Islamic Republic from
within. Groups such as Jondallah would figure prominently in such
a strategy (see Terrorism Monitor, August 2, 2007).
There is no concrete evidence that Jondallah maintains
a formal operational base in Pakistan. The difficult
terrain that characterizes the Iranian-Pakistani border
region is, however, a major crossroads for drug and arms
smuggling between locally-based gangs. The porous border
also facilitates links between Baloch families and tribes
on both sides of the border. In a testament to the extent
of Iranian and Pakistani Baloch links, a controversial
proposal by Islamabad to construct a wall along the border
inspired vocal protests from Pakistani Baloch leaders
who labeled the initiative the “anti-Baloch wall” (The
News International [Karachi], May 28, 2007). Given this
background, it is likely that Jondallah maintains contacts
over the border in Pakistan, possibly with Baloch insurgent
groups operating there, such as the Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA). There is no evidence, however, of formal
operational links between the two groups, as both appear
committed to furthering their respective causes separately
within the Iranian and Pakistani contexts.
The recent assassination of two-time Pakistani Prime
Minister and opposition leader Benazir Bhutto raises
questions about the trajectory of the Baloch insurgency
in Pakistan and—by extension—Iran. As a
center of Baloch nationalism, events in Pakistani Balochistan have
a profound impact on the Baloch cause in Iran. In an effort to win
support in Pakistani Balochistan for her campaign to oust incumbent
President Pervez Musharraf, Bhutto promised that her Pakistan People's
Party (PPP) would implement a general amnesty for Baloch prisoners
and rebels and immediately enter into negotiations with local leaders
to help settle the conflict. She also criticized Islamabad's heavy-handed
approach in dealing with the Baloch insurgency, accusing Musharraf
of exacerbating regional tensions (Dawn [Karachi], December 21, 2007);
her assassination was strongly condemned by Baloch activists. Ironically,
tensions between Pakistani Baloch and the state during her father
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's tenure as prime minister in the mid-1970s were
high. The senior Bhutto used brutal tactics—as well as direct material
and military support from the Shah of Iran that included helicopter
gunships and armored vehicles—to quell the armed Baloch uprising
[5]. The history of Iranian-Pakistani cooperation in jointly repressing
Baloch nationalism—a trend both countries see as a potential threat
to their respective territorial integrity and stability—suggests
that Iranian accusations of Islamabad's support for Jondallah in
Iran are unfounded.
Bhutto's assassination is not likely have a major impact
on the situation in Iranian Balochistan, at least not
directly. Despite expressions of solidarity and what
is most likely limited contact, ethnic Baloch rebels
in Iran and Pakistan will continue to devote their efforts
to pursuing local agendas, essentially focusing on furthering the
Baloch cause in Iran and Pakistan, respectively. Although Bhutto's
amnesty proposal may have set an interesting precedent for relations
between Tehran and Iranian Balochistan had she lived to implement
it, it is unlikely that Islamabad will pursue a similar course of
action in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
The simmering tensions and violence in Iranian Balochistan
will continue to characterize Tehran's interface with
its Baloch minority. The social, political and economic
grievances of the Iranian Baloch will remain a source
of resentment toward the clerical regime until Tehran
commits to integrating minorities into the fabric of society. Despite
Iranian claims, there is no conclusive evidence that the United States
is providing material support to Jondallah. It is likely, however,
that the group calculates its activities and operations to correspond
with periods of tension between the United States and Iran. This
enables Jondallah to maximize the effect of its campaign. At the
same time, Iran does have cause for concern, as the United States
could consider the possibility of supporting active insurgencies
as a means to pressure Iran during any potential conflict.
Notes
1. See “Iranian Security Forces Shooting at Furious Baloch Demonstration,” Balochistan
News, January 1, 2008. For footage of the alleged incident, see the
official website of the Baloch People's Party (BPP), a Baloch nationalist
organization based in Sweden: .
2. Demographic figures related to ethnic and sectarian
minority representation in Iran tend to be heavily politicized,
hence the wide ranging estimates.
3. The Baloch national cause is bolstered by a sophisticated
network of activists in the diaspora and online advocating
for their kin in Iran and Pakistan. For more details,
see ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; and .
4. The Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran includes
Kurdish, Azeri, Ahvazi (Arab), Turkmen, Baloch and other
organizations advocating the federalization of Iran along
ethnic and regional lines. For more details, see .
5. Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 219-221. |
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